Maryland Law Review
Volume 76 | Issue 4

Article 8

Rule 41 Amendments Provide for a Drastic
Expansion of Government Authority to Conduct
Computer Searches and Should Not Have Been
Adopted by the Supreme Court
Markus Rauschecker

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Fourth Amendment Commons, International Law
Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons
Recommended Citation
76 Md. L. Rev. 1085 (2017)

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

RULE 41 AMENDMENTS PROVIDE FOR A DRASTIC
EXPANSION OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT
COMPUTER SEARCHES AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
ADOPTED BY THE SUPREME COURT
MARKUS RAUSCHECKER*
INTRODUCTION
Advances in technology have created gaps in the law that hinder the
capabilities of law enforcement to conduct its investigations and prosecute
criminals. Prior to December 1, 2016, such a gap existed in Rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.1 As it was written, the Rule contained
a territorial limitation on a magistrate judge’s ability to issue a search warrant
and limited law enforcement’s ability to successfully apply for search warrants targeting internet-connected computers.2 With a few exceptions, magistrate judges were authorized to issue warrants only when the warrant was
to be executed within the judge’s district.3 This territorial limitation presented a problem for law enforcement as more and more online users began
employing technological tools to hide their locations.4 When law enforcement was unable to clearly identify the location of a computer it wanted to
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1. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b), with FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b), 18 U.S.C. app. (2012)
(amended 2016).
2. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b), H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 113TH CONG., FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 52–53 (Comm. Print 2014) (amended 2016).
3. Id.
4. Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks Highlighting
Cybercrime Enforcement at Center for Strategic and International Studies (Dec. 7, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-delivers-remarkshighlighting-cybercrime; see also Andy Greenberg, How to Anonymize Everything You Do Online,
WIRED (June 17, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/06/be-anonymous-online/ (noting
that “cryptography has shifted from an obscure branch of computer science to an almost mainstream
notion,” which makes it possible to hide internet activity).
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search, judges were hesitant to issue search warrants, because they were concerned that the computer could be located outside of their district and the
warrant would, therefore, run afoul of the territorial limitation of Rule 41.5
On April 28, 2016, Chief Justice John Roberts submitted a letter to Congress, giving notice of changes to Rule 41.6 The change to Rule 41 marked
the end of a three-year rulemaking process that included a long period of
public comment.7 Public hearings were held by the Advisory Committee on
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Advisory Committee approved
the rule change. The amendments were then unanimously approved by the
Standing Committee on Rules and the Judicial Conference, and adopted by
the United States Supreme Court.8 The amendments went into effect on December 1, 2016.9 The December 1, 2016, amendments to Rule 41 read as
follows:
[A] magistrate judge with authority in any district where activities
related to a crime may have occurred has authority to issue a warrant to use remote access to search electronic storage media and to
seize or copy electronically stored information located within or
outside that district if: (A) the district where the media or information is located has been concealed through technological means;
or (B) in an investigation of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5),
the media are protected computers that have been damaged without
authorization and are located in five or more districts.10
Proponents of the Rule 41 amendments see the changes as critical to
enabling law enforcement to effectively conduct investigations and prosecute
criminals in light of new technologies used by these criminals.11 Presumably,
everyone would agree that criminals should be identified and prosecuted, yet
5. See, e.g., In re Warrant to Search a Target Comput. at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp.
2d 753, 757, 761 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (denying a search warrant application because territorial requirements were not met).
6. Letter from John G. Roberts, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Paul D. Ryan, Speaker,
U.S. House of Representatives, and Joseph R. Biden Jr., President, U.S. Senate (Apr. 28, 2016),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcr16_mj80.pdf. The Supreme Court has authority to write rules of procedure pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, which was enacted by Congress in 1934. Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2071–77 (2012)).
7. Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Ron Wyden,
Senator, U.S. Senate (Nov. 18, 2016), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3225184/DOJRule-41-Response.pdf.
8. Id.
9. Letter from John G. Roberts to Paul Ryan & Joseph Biden, supra note 6.
10. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(B)(6); see also Letter from John G. Roberts to Paul Ryan & Joseph
Biden, supra note 6.
11. See, e.g., Leslie R. Caldwell, Rule 41 Changes Ensure a Judge May Consider Warrants
for Certain Remote Searches, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 20, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/rule-41-changes-ensure-judge-may-consider-warrants-certain-remote-searches.
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the Rule 41 amendments are concerning in that they provide for a drastic
expansion of government authority. Given that the rule changes are not
merely procedural, but provide a substantive expansion of government authority to conduct searches, the Supreme Court acted beyond the rulemaking
authority granted to it through the Rules Enabling Act. Rather, Congress
should have initiated, debated, and enacted these significant changes to Rule
41.
Part I of this Essay discusses the arguments in support of the Rule 41
changes. The changes provide law enforcement with a way to conduct computer searches in light of new technologies used by criminals. Part II discusses arguments against the Rule 41 changes. Opposition to the changes
existed in Congress, where Senator Wyden led an effort to prevent the
changes from taking effect. The Senator was joined by others arguing that
these rule changes are a significant expansion of government authority to
conduct searches and Congress should debate these changes. Civil liberties
groups also opposed the changes arguing that they provide for a drastic expansion of governmental surveillance powers and jeopardize privacy.
Part III of the Essay provides a closer analysis of the Rule 41 changes.
By examining the precise language of the amendments, it becomes evident
that the rule changes are vague and do, in fact, substantively expand the government’s ability to conduct searches. Furthermore, the rule changes violate
the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Part IV of the Essay
discusses likely additional consequences of the rule changes, such as violations of warrant notice requirements, violations of international law, and forum shopping.
I. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE RULE 41 AMENDMENTS
The change to Rule 41 is intended to help law enforcement investigate
and prosecute certain computer crimes.12 The advancement of technology
has made it more difficult for law enforcement to conduct its investigations,
because it is now difficult to locate search-targeted computers. Calls for
amending Rule 41 go back to April 2013, when a judge rejected a federal
government remote electronic search warrant application.13 Prior to the rule
change, courts would deny search warrants in cases where the location of the
target computer was unknown (except in limited situations), as the target
computer may have been located outside of the court’s district.14

12. Letter from Peter J. Kadzik to Ron Wyden, supra note 7.
13. See In re Warrant to Search a Target Comput. at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753,
761 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (denying a search warrant because of Rule 41 concerns and recognizing potential rationale for updating the rule).
14. See, e.g., id.
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A. In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown
The case of In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises
Unknown15 (“In re Warrant”) illustrates the reasoning for courts’ refusals to
grant search warrants when the target computers’ locations are unknown.16
In In re Warrant, the Government requested a search and seizure warrant
pursuant to Rule 41 to target a computer that was allegedly used to violate
federal bank fraud, identity theft, and computer security laws.17 Based on the
warrant, the Government sought to install data extraction software on the target computer to collect both metadata and content stored on the computer,
such as internet activity, emails, and photographs.18 The Government, however, did not know the precise location of the target computer, nor could it
ensure that only the targeted computer would be affected by the search. According to the court, the Government thereby failed to satisfy the territorial
limits of Rule 41, as well as the particularity requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.19 Thus, the court denied the Government’s warrant application.20
The court’s reasoning began with the premise that Rule 41 allows a
“magistrate judge with authority in the district . . . to issue a warrant to search
for and seize a person or property located within the district.”21 At the time
of the In re Warrant decision, Rule 41 authorized the issuance of a warrant
if the target property was outside of the judge’s district in only a few limited
circumstances: (1) when the target property “might . . . be moved outside the
[court’s] district before the warrant [was] executed”; (2) when the target
property was part of a terrorism investigation; (3) if the warrant pertained to
a tracking device that was installed inside the judge’s district, but had been
moved outside the judge’s district; (4) when “activities related to the
crime . . . occurred” in the judge’s district, and the target property was located
in a United States territory, or on “the premises—no matter who own[ed]
them—of a United States diplomatic or consular mission in a foreign state.”22
The In re Warrant court reviewed each of these exceptions to the territorial

15. 958 F. Supp. 2d 753.
16. Id. at 756–61.
17. Id. at 755.
18. Id. at 755–56.
19. Id. at 757, 759; see infra text accompanying note 25 (explaining the Fourth Amendment’s
particularity requirement).
20. In re Warrant, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 755.
21. Id. at 757 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1)).
22. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(2)–(5). The sections of Rule 41 that are cited here were not affected
by the 2016 amendments. Letter from John G. Roberts to Paul Ryan & Joseph Biden, supra note
6.
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limitation of Rule 41 and determined that none applied to the Government’s
warrant application.23
The court then turned to the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. The Fourth Amendment prescribes, “no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”24 In considering the particularity requirement, the court began by stating, “[t]he Government’s application contain[ed] little or no explanation of how the Target
Computer w[ould] be found.”25 Furthermore, the court argued, “[t]he Government’s application offer[ed] nothing but indirect and conclusory assurance that its search technique w[ould] avoid infecting innocent computers or
devices . . . .”26 Because the Government neither showed how it would identify the target computer nor provided assurances that the search would not
include other devices, the court rejected the Government’s warrant application on the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement, in addition to the
Rule 41 territorial requirement.27 Interestingly, however, in the concluding
paragraph of its opinion, the court acknowledged that “there may well be a
good reason to update the territorial limits of that rule in light of advancing
computer search technology.”28
B. The Department of Justice’s Arguments for Amending Rule 41
After the ruling in In re Warrant, the Department of Justice sought to
have Rule 41 amended. In a letter submitted to the Advisory Committee on
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Department argued in favor of
the Rule 41 amendments “to address two increasingly common situations.”29
First, the Department of Justice often knew what computer it wanted to
search, but did not know the district in which the computer was located.30
Secondly, the Department increasingly found itself needing to “coordinate
searches of multiple computers in multiple districts.”31 Both of these situa-

23. In re Warrant, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 757–58.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
25. In re Warrant, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 758.
26. Id. at 759.
27. Id. at 758–59.
28. Id. at 761.
29. Letter from Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the
Honorable Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Criminal Rules 1 (Sept. 18, 2013),
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Raman-letter-to-committee-.pdf.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1–2.
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tions represent instances of when the Department’s investigative and enforcement capabilities were limited due to advances in technology.32 Specific examples highlighted by the Department involved “a fraudster exchanging
email with an intended victim or a child abuser sharing child pornography
over the Internet [who] may use proxy services designed to hide his or her
true IP address.”33 The Department concluded: “There is a substantial public
interest in catching and prosecuting criminals [like these,] who use anonymizing technologies, but locating them can be impossible for law enforcement absent the ability to conduct a remote search of the criminal’s computer.”34
Additionally, the increasing emergence of botnets presents unique challenges to law enforcement.35 The magnitude of a botnet investigation, which
may involve thousands or even millions of computers located in virtually
every federal judicial district, imposes practical burdens on investigators.
The Department of Justice argued:
[A] large botnet investigation is likely to require action in all 94
districts, but coordinating 94 simultaneous warrants in the 94 districts would be impossible as a practical matter. At a minimum,
requiring so many magistrate judges to review virtually identical
probable cause affidavits wastes judicial and investigative resources and creates delays that may have adverse consequences for
the investigation.36
Considering the challenges posed by new technologies, such as botnets,
the Department of Justice argued that it needed new tools to maintain its investigative capabilities in the face of rapidly advancing technology. In response to prevailing critiques of the Rule 41 amendments, the Department
posted a statement posted on its website, in which Assistant Attorney General
Leslie R. Caldwell argued:
The amendments do not change any of the traditional protections
and procedures under the Fourth Amendment, such as the requirement that the government establish probable cause. Rather, the

32. Id.
33. Id. at 2.
34. Id.
35. A botnet refers to a group of computers that have been infiltrated by cybercriminals. What
Is a Botnet Attack?—Definition, KASPERSKY LAB, https://usa.kaspersky.com/internet-security-center/threats/botnet-attacks#.WH00x7GZMUE (last visited May 17, 2017). The cybercriminals install malware on the computers and create a network, which they then use to engage in cybercrime.
Id.
36. Letter from Mythili Raman to Reena Raggi, supra note 29.
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amendments would merely ensure that at least one court is available to consider whether a particular warrant application comports
with the Fourth Amendment.37
Caldwell emphasized that the amendments would not provide any new
authority to law enforcement to conduct searches.38 Fundamentally, the Department argued that the changes simply provide law enforcement with a
framework within which to investigate and prosecute cybercrime in light of
new technologies used by criminals.39
II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE CHANGES TO RULE 41
Opposition to the rule changes has been significant. Not only have interest groups, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Center for
Democracy and Technology, criticized the changes, but also several members of Congress have expressed their concerns and tried to block the amendments from taking effect. Opposition to the rule changes centered on the
belief that the changes provided for a significant expansion of government
authority to conduct computer searches. Moreover, this increased governmental authority would mean that individual privacy rights would be infringed.
A. Congressional Opposition to the Rule 41 Amendments
Congressional opposition against the Rule 41 amendments was led by
Oregon Senator Ron Wyden. Senator Wyden saw the amendments as a massive expansion of government authority to search computers.40 This search
authority would not be limited to perpetrators of cybercrime, but include victims of crime as well.41 Due to these concerns, Senator Wyden called on
Congress to reject the new rules through legislation.
Senator Wyden was especially troubled by new government capabilities
related to botnet investigations. The Rule 41 changes would enable the government to obtain a single warrant that would permit it to access and search
the thousands or millions of computers involved in a botnet.42 The majority
of the searched computers would belong to victims of botnets, rather than the
criminals behind the botnets.43 While the government may have a need to
37. Caldwell, supra note 11.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Press Release, Senator Ron Wyden, Wyden: Congress Must Reject Sprawling Expansion
of Government Surveillance (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-congress-must-reject-sprawling-expansion-of-government-surveillance.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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search affected botnet computers for evidence, such government authority
nevertheless raises significant privacy concerns for computer owners whose
computers may be searched.
Finally, Senator Wyden was concerned about the way in which these
rule changes were developed. In his view, the rule changes implicate privacy
rights, digital security and the Fourth Amendment.44 Therefore, the changes
should not be left to the Supreme Court’s rulemaking process, but rather to
Congress, the representative body of the American people, to decide: “Substantive policy changes like these are clearly a job for Congress, the American people and their elected representatives, not an obscure bureaucratic process.”45
Further evidence of congressional concern was presented on October
27, 2016, when a group of over twenty concerned members of Congress sent
a letter to then-U.S. Attorney General, Loretta Lynch, requesting responses
to a series of significant questions about the rule change.46 In particular, the
members asked Attorney General Lynch to specify how the department
would notify users that their devices had been searched, the grounds on which
probable cause authorizes “the remote search of tens of thousands of devices,” and what procedures the department would put in place to protect
users’ private information.47 These questions regarding the rule changes and
the concerns about expanding government authority to search computers led
Senator Wyden and others to introduce legislation to stop the rule changes.48
Ultimately, however, the legislative efforts brought forth by Senator Wyden
and others failed to prevent the rule changes from taking effect.49
B. Civil Liberties Groups’ Opposition to the Rule 41 Amendments
Ever since the amendments to the rule were proposed, civil liberties
groups argued that the changes provided for a dangerous expansion of government surveillance powers. Indeed, the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
which has been very vocal in its opposition to the rule changes, argued that
the amendments are not “merely a procedural update. [They] significantly
expand[] the hacking capabilities of the United States government without

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Letter from Ron Wyden et al., Senator, U.S. Senate, to Loretta Lynch, Attorney Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=586322BE-A9574C97-94C3-23CD8219DE1F&download=1.
47. Id.
48. S. 2952, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R. 5321, 114th Cong. (2016).
49. Joe Uchill, Last-Ditch Effort to Prevent Changes to Law Enforcement Hacking Rule Fails,
THE HILL (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:13 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/308088-last-ditch-effort-to-prevent-change-to-rule-41-fails.
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any discussion or public debate by elected officials.”50 If law enforcement is
to be given a substantive expansion of its authority to conduct searches, then,
according to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, that expansion should be
provided by Congress as the representative body of the American people.51
Similarly, the Center for Democracy and Technology called the Rule 41
amendments “astoundingly dangerous” and posited that they could have
“profound consequences for the privacy and security of computers worldwide.”52
While the Supreme Court has the authority to make changes to procedural rules governing the federal courts, it may not make substantive changes
to the law.53 Members of Congress as well as civil liberties groups saw the
Rule 41 amendments as substantive changes to the law in that the amendments expanded government’s ability to conduct computer searches and affect computer users’ privacy. From their perspective, Congress, as the legislative branch, should have been the entity that passed the Rule 41
amendments.
III. A CLOSER ANALYSIS OF THE RULE 41 AMENDMENTS
The Rule 41 amendments provide a magistrate judge with the authority
to issue a search warrant for a target computer outside of the judge’s district
in two new circumstances: (1) when the location of the target “has been concealed through technological means,” and (2) when, in a Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act investigation, the target computers “have been damaged without
authorization and are located in five or more districts.”54 The implications of
these amendments are concerning in that they drastically expand the scope of
the government’s ability to conduct computer searches. First, the amendments allow government to search computers that are “concealed through
technological means,” which is unduly vague language. Second, the amendments likely violate the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Third, the amendments will allow government to search not only the computers of criminals, but the computers of the criminals’ victims as well.

50. Rainey Reitman, With Rule 41, Little-Known Committee Proposes to Grant New Hacking
Powers to the Government, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG (Apr. 30, 2016),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/04/rule-41-little-known-committee-proposes-grant-new-hacking-powers-government.
51. Id.
52. Jadzia Butler, U.S. Supreme Court Endorses Government Hacking, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY
& TECH.: BLOG (May 6, 2016), https://cdt.org/blog/u-s-supreme-court-endorses-government-hacking/.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012) (“Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right).
54. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6).
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A. Rule 41(b)(6)(A): “Concealed Through Technological Means” Is
Vague and Drastically Expands the Scope of the Government’s
Ability to Conduct Searches
Law enforcement has been struggling with the increasingly common situation of needing to describe a computer to be searched, but not knowing its
precise location. Frequently, targets of law enforcement investigations are
using technologies that hide their locations online.55 Undoubtedly, new
anonymizing technologies provide challenges to law enforcement. Yet, it has
to be noted that such technologies are not just used by criminals. Often, computer users have very legitimate reasons for using technologies that hide their
identities online.
For example, as the Electronic Frontier Foundation points out, “people
who use Tor, folks running a Tor node, or people using a VPN would certainly be implicated” by the Rule amendments.56 Furthermore, the new language could extend to individuals who chose not to share their location with
apps or ad networks, or people who change their country setting in order to
gain access to services that they otherwise would not be able to.57 There are
many additional reasons why someone may want to use anonymizing technologies:
From journalists communicating with sources to victims of domestic violence seeking information on legal services, people worldwide depend on privacy tools for both safety and security. Millions
of people who have nothing in particular to hide may also choose
to use privacy tools just because they’re concerned about government surveillance of the Internet, or because they don’t like leaving
a data trail around haphazardly.58
These examples illustrate that, in many cases, individuals may hide their
identities online for reasons that are not at all motivated by any criminal intent. The changes to Rule 41 could, however, subject these individuals to
government searches.
In response to these concerns, the Department of Justice argues that the
use of anonymizing technology in and of itself does not provide grounds for
a search warrant. The government must still demonstrate probable cause that
55. ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, CRIMINAL RULES COMMITTEE MEETING 88
(2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-rulescriminal-procedure-may-2015.
56. Reitman, supra note 50; Ian Paul, How—and Why—You Should Use a VPN Any Time You
Hop on the Internet, TECHHIVE (Jan. 18, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.techhive.com/article/3158192/privacy/howand-whyyou-should-use-a-vpn-any-time-you-hop-on-the-internet.html;
Tor: Overview, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited May 17,
2017).
57. Reitman, supra note 50.
58. Id.
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evidence of a crime will be discovered before a magistrate judge will issue a
search warrant. Assistant Attorney General Caldwell was blunt in her remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies:
[The update to the rule] doesn’t change the level of evidence and
proof that we have to present to a judge in order to get the judge to
agree that there’s probable cause to issue a warrant. What [the rule]
does change is, now, when criminals hide the location of their computers through anonymizing technology, we don’t have to figure
out which federal district the computers are physically located in
before we can act to stop criminal activity.59
Assistant Attorney General Caldwell’s comments imply that the use of
anonymizing technology is not grounds for a search warrant. Law enforcement must still demonstrate probable cause that evidence of a crime will be
found if a search warrant is to be issued. Nevertheless, the amended Rule
provides a new ability for government to conduct expansive searches of computers. Even if government is able to demonstrate probable cause, it must no
longer clearly identify the location of a computer to be searched, and it may
use a single warrant to search thousands or even millions of computers.
B. The Rule 41 Amendments Violate the Particularity Requirement of
the Fourth Amendment
The amendments to Rule 41 violate the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. The Fourth Amendment requires that no warrants be issued without “particularity describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”60
Without being able to describe the location of the target to be searched,
it is difficult to see how law enforcement may satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. Moreover, the methods that law enforcement would presumably use to enable a search of a target computer could
have the unintended consequence of accessing innocent computers.61 For
example, the rule changes would allow a single warrant to be the basis for
searching hundreds, thousands, or even millions, of computers if they are all
part of a botnet. It is doubtful that each of the many involved computers
would be described with particularity.

59. The State of Cybercrime: A Look Back and a Look Forward, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L
STUDIES 17:18 (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.csis.org/events/state-cybercrime-look-back-and-lookforward.
60. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
61. For example, law enforcement could access innocent computers through the use of watering hole attacks or users forwarding a government phishing email. See Memorandum from American Civil Liberties Union to Members of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules (Oct. 31,
2014), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_comment_on_remote_access_proposal.pdf.
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Unfortunately, these constitutional concerns were not explored by the
Advisory Committee when it contemplated the rule changes. Indeed, the
Committee chose to pass questions of constitutionality on for the courts to
decide:
The amendment does not address constitutional questions, such as
the specificity of description that the Fourth Amendment may require in a warrant for remotely searching electronic storage media
or seizing or copying electronically stored information, leaving the
application of this and other constitutional standards to ongoing
case law development.62
It is concerning that questions of constitutionality were not considered
during the development of the rule amendments. It is even more concerning
that law enforcement would have new authorities that are potentially unconstitutional until courts decide otherwise.
C. Rule 41(b)(6)(B): Allowing Government to Search Victim
Computers That Are Part of a Botnet Is a Sweeping Expansion of
Government Authority
The amendments to Rule 41 will allow the government to search all
computers that are part of a botnet. This new authority is a sweeping expansion of government authority. In particular, Rule 41(b)(6)(B) allows a magistrate judge of a district where activities related to a crime may have occurred
to issue a warrant that permits law enforcement to use remote access to search
electronic storage media and to seize or copy electronically stored information. A magistrate judge may exercise this authority if, “in an investigation of a violation of [the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act], the media are
protected computers that have been damaged without authorization and are
located in five or more districts.”63
The effect of the rule changes, however, has worrisome implications for
individual computer users, most of whom are not criminals. The authority
granted in this new section of Rule 41,
means victims of malware could find themselves doubly infiltrated: their computers infected with malware and used to contribute to a botnet, and then government agents given free rein to remotely access their computers as part of the investigation. Even
with the best of intentions, a government agent could well cause as
much or even more harm to a computer through remote access than

62. ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, CRIMINAL RULES COMMITTEE MEETING 141
(2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-rulescriminal-procedure-may-2015.
63. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6)(B).
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the malware that originally infected the computer. . . . Government access to the computers of botnet victims also raises serious
privacy concerns, as a wide range of sensitive, unrelated personal
data could well be accessed during the investigation.64
During a panel discussion presented by the Stanford Center for Internet
and Society in October 2016, Allison Bragg, Assistant United States Attorney, offered a justification for the government’s need to search computers
that have been compromised as part of a botnet.65 She stated that data on
computers that have been compromised as part of a botnet is evidence of a
crime and the government must have access to that evidence.66 The government’s need to obtain this evidence is the reason why the government should
be able to search a “victim’s” computer.67 Bragg analogized this kind of
search with the government executing a warrant to search the home of an
innocent bystander to collect a gun that was used for a murder, unbeknownst
to the gun-owner and owner of the home being searched.68 Since the government’s search of the home is legal, Bragg argues, the government’s search of
botnets is legal as well.
The Department of Justice further responded to opponents of Rule 41
amendments by stating:
In general, we anticipate that the items to be searched or seized
from victim computers pursuant to a botnet warrant will be quite
limited. For example, we believe that it may be reasonable in a
botnet investigation to take steps to measure the size of the botnet
by having each victim computer report a unique identifier; but it
would not be lawful in such circumstances to search the victims’
unrelated private files.69
In other words, law enforcement claims that it may not search the entire
victim computer and that the particularity requirement limits the extent of
what is to be searched and seized. While the Department’s response may be
commendable, it does not guarantee the scope of computer searches will not
expand beyond the directly affected computer, or that private files truly remain private and protected. Despite the Department’s assurances, countless
computers may end up being searched pursuant to a single warrant issued on
the basis of the new Rule 41 amendments. The vast majority of the owners

64. Reitman, supra note 50.
65. Government Hacking: Rule 41, STANFORD LAW SCH. CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y
1:08:13–109:35 (Oct. 27, 2016), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/events/government-hacking-rule-41.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Letter from Peter J. Kadzik to Ron Wyden, supra note 8.
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of these computers will have no connection to the criminal activity being investigated other than being victims of the criminal botnet. Moreover, the
computer owners’ private information will be put at risk every time it is accessed remotely. So, even if the Department intends to limit itself when conducting computer searches under Rule 41, it is reasonable to expect that the
number of computers and the information involved in a government search
will be beyond the scope of the warrant.
IV. ADDITIONAL LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF THE RULE 41 AMENDMENTS
In addition to specific concerns related to the venue amendments contained in section (b)(6), there are other troubling consequences to the Rule 41
amendments, including violations of warrant notice requirements, violations
of international law, and forum shopping.
A. Rule 41 Amendments May Violate the Warrant Notice Requirement
Rule 41(f)(1)(C) requires that an “officer executing [a] warrant must
give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person
from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken.”70 Recognizing the impracticality of notifying owners of computers of unknown location,
or notifying every owner of the thousands or millions of computers involved
in a botnet, Rule 41 establishes a different notice requirement for remote electronic searches. In cases where government conducts remote electronic
searches, government must only make “reasonable efforts” to notify the
owner of the property that was searched:
For a warrant to use remote access to search electronic storage media and seize or copy electronically stored information, the officer
must make reasonable efforts to serve a copy of the warrant and
receipt on the person whose property was searched or who possessed the information that was seized or copied. Service may be
accomplished by any means, including electronic means, reasonably calculated to reach that person.71
Providing notice to computer owners may be difficult and impractical.
For its part, the Department of Justice says that in an investigation involving
botnet victims, for example, the Department would make reasonable efforts
to notify victims of searches: “if investigators obtained victims’ IP addresses
at a particular date and time in order to measure the size of the botnet, inves-

70. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(C) (emphasis added).
71. Letter from John G. Roberts to Paul D. Ryan & Joseph Biden, supra note 6.
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tigators could ask the victims’ Internet service providers to notify the individuals whose computers were identified as being under the control of criminal bot herders.”72
It is unrealistic, however, to expect every computer owner of an affected
botnet to be notified of a government search. Botnets may include hundreds,
thousands, or millions of computers. Due to this fact, there is a significant
chance that owners of computers that have been searched will never receive
notice that a search has occurred. However, as long as government made a
“reasonable effort” to notify owners of searched computers, government
would be in compliance with Rule 41. It is unclear, however, what notice
attempts would constitute a reasonable effort. Especially concerning is the
fact that the owners of searched computers who do not get notice of a search
may never find out that a search has occurred and will therefore never be able
to contest the search warrant. In this situation, a court will not review the
search warrant’s legitimacy, thus failing to exercise a necessary check on law
enforcement power.
B. Rule 41 Amendments May Lead to Violations of International Law
If the location of a target computer is unknown, it may be the case that
the computer is located outside of the United States. If law enforcement conducts an electronic remote search based on Rule 41, and the target computer
is outside of the United States’ jurisdiction, such a search may be considered
a violation of state sovereignty and international law.
The Rule 41 amendments may run counter to United States treaty obligations. For example, the Convention on Cybercrime, also known as the Budapest Convention, is explicit about allowing trans-border access to stored
computer data only if the data is publicly available or if “lawful and voluntary” consent is obtained from the country in which the search would take
place.73
Indeed, Department of Justice policies instruct law enforcement officers
to:
exercise their functions in the territory of another country only with
the consent of that country . . . . Moreover U.S. law enforcement
should only make direct contact with an ISP located in [a foreign
country] with (1) prior permission of the foreign government; (2)
approval of [the Department of Justice’s] Office of International

72. Letter from Peter J. Kadzik to Ron Wyden, supra note 8.
73. Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, art. 32, Nov. 23,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680081561.
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Affairs . . . ; or (3) other clear indicia that such practice would not
be objectionable in [the foreign country].74
This Department policy aligns with the United States treaty obligation
under the Convention on Cybercrime. Furthermore, the Department of Justice assured the Advisory Committee: “[S]hould the media searched prove to
be outside the United States, the warrant would have no extraterritorial effect,
but the existence of the warrant would support the reasonableness of the
search.”75 The Department thereby affirmed that it would not conduct
searches outside of the United States pursuant to a warrant issued under the
Rule 41 amendments.
Nevertheless, if law enforcement does not actually know where a computer is located, it may very well end up searching a computer that is located
in another country. If that happens, a violation of international law will have
occurred and the legal, as well as the geo-political, fallout could be unsettling.
C. Rule 41 Amendments May Lead to Forum Shopping by Law
Enforcement Officers Seeking a Search Warrant
The Rule 41 amendments provide magistrate judges, in any district
where activities related to a crime may have occurred, with the authority to
issue warrants to conduct remote electronic searches.76 Given this Rule
change, law enforcement officers who seek a remote electronic search warrant may be tempted to apply for the warrant in a district that is historically
friendly to such government requests. Such forum shopping is undesirable
because it may further diminish protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Different judges may have different opinions on the sufficiency
of a warrant application, especially when complicated technological issues
are involved. Instead of having to seek a warrant in their own jurisdiction,
where a judge may be less inclined to grant the warrant, law enforcement
now has the ability to simply go to a different district where the magistrate
judge has demonstrated a willingness to grant such warrants.
According to the Department of Justice, the language of the amended
rule actually limits the possibility of forum shopping. The venue in which a
magistrate judge may issue a warrant for a remote search is restricted to “any
district where activities related to a crime may have occurred.”77 The Department contends that this language will:
74. OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, SEARCHING AND SEIZING
COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 56–57
(2009),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf.
75. Letter from Mythili Raman to Reena Raggi, supra note 29, at 5.
76. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6).
77. Id.
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Often . . . leave only a single district in which investigators can
seek a warrant. For example, where a victim has received death
threats, extortion demands, or ransomware demands from a criminal hiding behind Internet anonymizing technologies, the victim’s
district would likely be the only district in which a warrant could
be issued for a remote search to identify the perpetrator.78
Despite the attempted assurances of the Department, however, it is not
hard to imagine that law enforcement officers will tend to choose to apply for
warrants in jurisdictions with sympathetic judges.
V. CONCLUSION
Proponents of the Rule 41 changes argue that the changes are procedural
and not substantive. They argue that the changes apply only to venue selection and will not negate fundamental legal requirements, such as demonstrating probable cause. It is difficult, however, to deny the substantive effects of
the rule change. Given that the rule change, in its practical effect, provides
for a significant expansion of the government’s ability to search computers,
the amendments to Rule 41 should not have been adopted by the Supreme
Court. The Rules Enabling Act, which gives the Supreme Court the authority
to prescribe rules of judicial procedure is explicit in that “such rules shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”79 Because the Rule 41
amendments do provide new substantive authorities to law enforcement to
conduct computer searches, the Supreme Court acted beyond its authority.
Only Congress has the authority to allocate new legal authority to law enforcement through the legislative process. With respect to Rule 41, elected
officials should have debated these critical changes to the Rule publicly and
considered the potential consequences carefully. Even though the Rule
changes went into effect on December 1, 2016, Congress could still choose
to examine the amendments more closely and repeal or amend them in the
future. For now, magistrate judges who are asked to issue a search warrant
based on the new Rule 41 amendments should consider the application carefully to ensure Fourth Amendment protections are still protected.

78. Letter from Peter J. Kadzik to Ron Wyden, supra note 8.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).

